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"Wars between sovereign states appear to be a phenomenon in
distinct decline. Tragically, however, the lives of millions of
people around the globe continue to be blighted by violence. "
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I. Introduction
The majority of armed conflict today occurs within states and
involves one or more non-state armed groups (NSAGs).2 In 2007,
there were over 261 active non-state armed groups.3 The
repercussions of internal armed conflict involving NSAGs include
extensive violations of international humanitarian law (IHL).4
NSAGs are responsible for a range of violent acts, such as
deliberately targeting civilians, destructing civilian property, and
2 See JORN GRAVINGHOLT, CLAUDIA HOFMANN & STEPHAN KLINGEBIEL,
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS 1 (2007),
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ (search publications for "Development
Cooperation and Non-State Armed Groups") ("Civil wars and other intrastate violent
conflicts, which by their nature are characterized by the participation of NSAGs on at
least one side, have dominated warfare since the end of the Second World War, so much
so that war between states has increasingly become the exception rather than the rule.");
see also HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY BRIEF 2007 (2007),
http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2007/text.aspx (reporting no inter-state
conflicts in 2006, yet there were thirty civil wars involving at least one non-state actor,
and twenty-four internal conflicts between only non-state armed groups. The report
considers conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan "internationalized intrastate conflicts" and
not inter-state conflicts).
3 See Olivier Bangerter, The ICRC and Non-State Armed Groups, in EXPLORING
CRITERIA & CONDITIONS FOR ENGAGING ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS TO RESPECT HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 74 (2008), http://www.genevacall.org/resources/conference-reports/f-
conference-reports/2001-2010/gc-2007-04-05jun-geneva.pdf [hereinafter GENEVA CALL
2007 CONFERENCE REPORT].




committing rape and other forms of sexual violence.' Despite the
increasing role of NSAGs in armed conflict, IHL remains state-
centric and provides limited opportunities for armed groups to
comply with its provisions or engage in its development.' This
comment argues that the legal framework regulating internal
armed conflict and NSAGs is inadequate and much weaker than
the rules that govern states involved in international armed
conflict. Nonetheless, all populations in areas of armed conflict,
whether international or internal, deserve the same level of
protection by IHL.
Part II examines the definition and development of NSAGs
and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
accommodating NSAGs under IHL. Part III outlines the current
legal framework of IHL to determine the level of regulation of
NSAGs during an internal armed conflict. This consideration
necessitates an analysis of conventional and customary provisions
of IHL that govem the actions of NSAGs, focusing primarily on
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 19497 and their
Additional Protocols of 1977. This section also analyzes
alternative legal measures to regulate NSAGs, such as special and
military agreements. Part IV looks specifically at the application
of IHL to one NSAG, the Polisario Front. The case study
demonstrates that IHL violations have been taking place for more
than forty years in the context of internal armed conflict in
Western Sahara. The analysis provides insight into the ability of
NSAGs to engage and comply with IHL. Part V offers
recommendations, focusing on measures to hold NSAGs more
accountable and to better incorporate NSAGs into the IHL legal
framework.
5 See Greta Zeender, Protecting the Internally Displaced: An Opportunity for
International NGOs to Engage NSAs, in GENEVA CALL 2007 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 98-99 (2008) (explaining that "killing, displacement, sexual violence, property
destruction, and other abuses" are purposefully used by NSAGs).
6 See Pascal Bongard, Engaging Armed Non-State Actors on Humanitarian
Norms: The Experience of Geneva Call and the Landmine Ban, in GENEVA CALL 2007
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 108, 111.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art.
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions of 1949].
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 1, T 1, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
2012] 795
N.C. J. INT'T L. & COM. REG.
II. Overview of Non-State Armed Groups
A. Defining Non-State Armed Groups and Internal Armed
Conflict
NSAGs vary widely in size, organization, motives, goals and
resources, making the term "non-state armed group" difficult to
define.' The vast number of NSAGs and the fact that these groups
often have a fluid membership and rapidly changing goals
compound the difficulty of agreeing on a useful definition.o The
International Council on Human Rights Policy defines NSAGs as
"groups that are armed and use force to achieve their objectives
and are not under state control."" This definition incorporates two
elements: lack of state control and the use of force. Geneva Call, a
neutral organization with the goal of achieving non-state actors'
compliance with international humanitarian and human rights
laws, introduces an additional element by defining armed groups
as "involved in situations of armed conflict that operate outside
effective State control and are primarily motivated by political
goals." 2 This definition suggests that NSAGs have a political
agenda instead of a private one. Therefore, the term NSAG
generally refers to "rebel groups, liberation movements and de
facto governments" with a political agenda. 3 The term NSAG
9 See Claudia Hofmann, Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Humanitarian
Action, 13 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 396, 396 (2006), http://www.die-gdi.de/ (select
"Publications;" search "Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Humanitarian Action").
10 See id
11 INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, ENDS AND MEANS: HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACHES TO ARMED GROUPS 5 (2000),
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/6/105 report en.pdf. The International Council on
Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) is a non-governmental organization that provides
research and policy recommendations.
12 About Us, GENEVA CALL, http://www.genevacall.org/about/about.htm (last
visited Jan. 17, 2012). Geneva Call is a NGO that works with NSAGs to increase
compliance with IHL. See also Soliman Santos Jr., Will An Agreement On Respect for
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Forged Between Governments and
Nonstate Actors Promote Human Security?, 21 KASARINLAN: PHILIPPINE J. THIRD
WORLD STUD. 176, 176 ("Nonstate armed groups (NSAGs) refer mainly to rebel or
insurgent groups, i.e., groups that are armed and autonomous from the state and use force
to achieve their political/quasi-political objectives.") [hereinafter Santos, Agreement on
Respect for Human Rights].
13 Hofmann, supra note 9, at 396.
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does not include criminal organizations, such as the mafia and
drug cartels, private security companies, and mercenaries.14 This
comment bases its definition of NSAG loosely on the three
elements identified above: lack of state control, use of force, and
some degree of politically motivated action.
While no international treaty explicitly defines the term
NSAG, the two Additional Protocols of 1977 provide guidelines
regarding the types of armed groups that are covered under the
Protocols' provisions." Article 1(1) of Protocol II stipulates that
the Protocol applies to armed groups with an organizational
hierarchy that enables leaders to control subordinates and permit
them to carry "sustained and concerted military operations.""
Protocol I excludes "mercenaries," who are described in part as
parties motivated by "the desire for private gain."" While it
seems logical to define NSAGs based on command relations,
territorial control, relationship with the State, and political
motives, there are shortcomings to this approach. First, many
NSAGs do not have clearly defined command structures and
instead operate as loosely organized groups or cells.' The degree
of discipline and the amount of control superiors have over their
subordinates is extremely difficult to measure, especially when an
NSAG operates underground or there is limited public information
or access to the group.' 9 An NSAG's control over territory is also
difficult to measure and varies widely.2 0 Some NSAGs control
I4 See id
15 The substantive limitations of the Additional Protocols will be discussed in more
detail in Part II. The aim of this section is to demonstrate the difficulty of defining
NSAGs both academically and legally.
16 Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 1.
17 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts, art. 47, 2, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
18 See LIESBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2002).
19 See Hofmann, supra note 9, at 398-99; see also GRAVINGHOLT ET AL., supra note
2, at 55 (discussing the complex organization of NSAGs, including the high level of
secrecy that characterizes many NSAGs).
20 See ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 1 ("At one extreme, such groups [NSAGs]
resemble de facto governments, with control over territory and population. At the other
extreme, they are militarily and politically inferior to the established government,
exercising no direct control over territory and operating only sporadically.").
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sufficient territory to operate similarly to a state, providing public
safety and services, and even collecting taxes.21 For example, the
Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: GAM), which is
no longer an NSAG as it now forms part of Indonesia's
government,2 2 visibly controlled large parts of territory in Aceh,
Indonesia, and funded its operations through an extensive tax
system.2 Other NSAGs influence territory through non-physical
means, such as using the area to recruit members, traffic small
arms and light weapons, plant landmines, block the delivery of
aid, and engage in a range of other activities.2 4
Contrary to the requirements of Article 1(1) of Protocol II, not
all NSAGs act in strict opposition to the government.25 For
example, in Somalia, where there is no nationally recognized
government, armed groups fight against each other.26 In the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), armed groups fight the
government and each other.27 Other NSAGs are sponsored or
controlled at some level by the government, although a
21 For example, consider Hezbollah in Lebanon or FARC in Colombia. See
CLAUDE BRUDERLEIN, ANDREW CLAPHAM, KEITH KRAUSE & MOHAMMAD-MAHMOUD
OULD MOHAMEDOU, TRANSNATIONAL AND NON-STATE ACTORS: ISSUES AND
CHALLENGES: CONCEPT NOTE 1 (2007),
http://www.tagsproject.org/_data/global/images/Overview.pdf see also GRAVINGHOLT
ET AL., supra note 2, at 62-64 (discussing the revenue base of NSAGs, including
taxation, organized crime, and pillaging).
22 See Albert Harris, Separatist Insurgency, Objective Referents and Autonomy, 45
COOPERATION & CONFLICT 387, 395, available at
http://cac.sagepub.com/content/45/4/387.full.pdf+html (stating that the GAM has been
incorporated into the government establishment in Indonesia).
23 See KRISTEN SCHULZE, THE FREE ACEH MOVEMENT: ANATOMY OF A SEPARATIST
ORGANIZATION 27 (2004),
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/PS002.pdf (noting that GAM
collected 1.1 billion rupiah in 2003-approximately $130,000 each month-through
taxes on personal and business income).
24 GENEVA CALL, ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS AND LANDMINES. VOLUME III:
TOWARDS HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS? 1 (2007),
http://www.genevacall.org/resources/research/f-research/2001-2010/gc-2007-nov-
ansal3.pdf.
25 See Protocol II, supra note 17, art. 1 T 1; see also ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at
139; INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 11, at 6.
26 See ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 139 (noting that the conflict in Somalia involves
fighting by at least "thirty clans" and "numerous loosely organized factions and clans,
lacking any real power").
27 See INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 11, at 6.
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government may deny controlling the group and denounce its
support for the group's activities.28 As these examples
demonstrate, it is not always clear if an NSAG is truly a "non-
state" entity and completely disconnected from government
control.29
Lastly, while identifying NSAGs by their objectives may be
useful, it should be noted that some NSAGs do not have clearly
identifiable political objectives, or alternatively, they may
combine such political objectives with criminal activity.3 0 The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) sums up many
of these obstacles to defining and classifying NSAGs:
Amongst armed groups, the distinction between politically-
motivated action and organized crime is fading away. All too
often, the political objectives are unclear, if not subsidiary to the
crimes perpetrated while allegedly waging one's struggle. Are
we dealing with a liberation army resorting to terrorist acts, or
with a criminal ring that tries to give itself political credibility?
28 See id. at 8. For example, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia are
reported to collaborate with the State military and police, although the government
denies that it has any control over the group and denounces their activities. The report
argues that it is not always easy to distinguish between NSAGs that have "implicit State
support from a genuinely autonomous armed group." The report provides examples
from Northern Ireland, Turkey, Sierra Leona, and the Congo. See also GRAVINGHOLT ET
AL., supra note 2, at 59-61 (discussing alliances between ruling regimes and NSAGs,
giving Tajikistan as an example).
29 Marco Sass6li argues that most armed conflicts today are clearly defined as
international or internal, and most armed groups are not transnational. See Marco
Sassbli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law, PROGRAM
ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, HARVARD UNIV., OCCASIONAL
PAPER SERIES, Winter 2006,
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/OccasionalPaper6.pdf.
However, scholars such as James Stewart argue that it is becoming difficult to
distinguish international and internal armed conflict as internal conflicts become
"internationalized." Id. This comment focuses on NSAGs involved in internal armed
conflict. This distinction is critical when determining the IHL applicable to NSAGs. Id
As the next section demonstrates, transnational NSAGs may be held accountable to a
different set of rules of IHL if they are involved in a conflict that is classified as
international. See also James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition ofArmed Conflict
in International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 313 (2003),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_850stewart.pdf.
30 See INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 11, at 6.
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No matter how one chooses to classify such armed groups, their
lack of discipline and structured command, their
unpredictability, their lack of interest in achieving external
recognition . .. constitute additional obstacles to their
observance of international standards.
The difficulty of establishing a definition of NSAGs is
compounded by the highly political nature of the topic and the
groups themselves. 32 Terminology surrounding NSAGs is often
politically charged. Armed groups are called "terrorists" or
"criminals" by some and "liberation fighters" or "revolutionaries"
by others.33 Nicolas Florquin and Elisabeth Decrey, a program
officer and a cofounder of Geneva Call, respectively, argue that
the trend to label NSAGs as "terrorists" in recent years has
"[dismissed] the challenges NSAGs present to state sovereignty
and territorial control and justifies responses based on-at times
unrestrained-force rather than dialogue."34 This comment
acknowledges merit in using a neutral term, namely NSAG, which
encourages an unbiased and respectful discussion of key actors in
today's armed conflict.
B. The Potential to Accommodate Non-State Armed Groups
The growth of interest in NSAGs has also brought about a
debate over the advantages and disadvantages of accommodating
NSAGs under IHL." Jrn Grdivingholt points out that certain
governments, such as Switzerland and Norway, as well as several
international humanitarian agencies have dealt with NSAGs on a
regular basis.36 Nonetheless, engagement with NSAGs by other
31 Id. (citing HOLDING ARMED GROUPS TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: AN ICRC
CONTRIBUTION TO THE RESEARCH PROJECT OF THE ICHRP 2-3 (1999)).
32 Hofmann, supra note 9, at 396.
33 See INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 11, at 6.
34 Nicholas Florquin & Elisabeth Decrey Warner, Engaging Non-State Armed
Groups or Listing Terrorists? Implications for the Arms Community, DISARMAMENT
FORUM 17-18 (2008), available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2708.pdf.
35 GRAVINGHOLT ET AL., supra note 2, at 2-3 (noting that interest in NSAGs has
attracted attention since the early 1990s and more recently with the 9/11 terrorist
attacks).
36 See Jm Gravingholt, Engaging Armed Groups in Development Cooperation, in
GENEVA CALL 2007 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 36.
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actors has been very low." NSAGs are a reality for states,
international development, humanitarian agencies, the United
Nations (U.N.), international organization (10) representatives,
and any other actor working in the area of armed conflict as well."
As Marco Sass6li asserts, "[wie have to deal with this reality [of
armed groups] and the first step towards gaining respect for some
rules is to speak to the people involved and to have mechanisms
engaging with these people.""
NSAGs play an important role in the success of humanitarian
operations and the protection of humanitarian personnel.40 During
an armed conflict, the population affected by the conflict requires
humanitarian assistance and services. I1 some cases, NSAGs
control large parts of a territory and are even considered to be de
facto governments.4 In these circumstances, organizations must
reach an understanding with the NSAG, rather than with the
established government, to gain access and provide unhindered
assistance to the population.43 Furthermore, engagement with
NSAGs lowers the risks posed to personnel working in a region
controlled by NSAGs." This same logic can be applied to
37 See id
38 See generally Marco Sass6li, Engaging Non-State Actors: The New Frontier for
International Humanitarian Law, in GENEVA CALL 2007 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 8 (discussing how various organizations and entities can engage NSAGs).
39 Id. at 11.
40 See, e.g., GRAVINGHOLT ET AL., supra note 2, at 7 (discussing engagement of
NSAGs, such as "negotiations with kidnappers, agreements with NSAGs on transport
routes for aid supplies, political appeals to NSAGs not to recruit child soldiers or to use
land mines" and suggesting four motives for engagement to improve development
efforts).
41 See id at 6 (explaining that humanitarian organizations are often unable to avoid
direct contact with NSAGs during conflicts to carry out their goals).
42 See id. at 90-91 (discussing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eela's de facto power
and administrative structures that were "able to cope fairly effectively with the direct
consequences of the tsunami").
43 See Grhvingholt, supra note 36, at 38; see also GRAVINGHOLT ET AL., supra note
2, at 91 ("Engagement with groups completely or largely in control of an area may be
necessary at least from a humanitarian viewpoint and for granting access to information.
Such engagement may concern negotiated access to an area or even cooperation.").
44 See Gravingholt, supra note 36, at 39. Humanitarian workers are often the
deliberate targets of attacks, kidnappings, robbery and murder by NSAGs. Examples are
numerous and include Chechyna, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, West Timor,
Liberia, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan. See Ros Thomas, Aid Worker Safety and
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improve the safety and effectiveness for other workers operating
in areas under NSAG control, such as journalists, peacekeepers,
and religious and medical personnel.4 5
NSAGs are important actors not only during times of conflict,
but also after an armed conflict has ended. They can play a role in
the effectiveness of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR) programs.4 6 NSAGs have knowledge of the
terrain and the placement of mines, so it is critical that they are
involved in any de-mining process.47 Furthermore, a group that
was originally an NSAG may form a political party and become
part of a state's government; therefore, it is important to engage
NSAGs from early on in the conflict. 48  Hofmann asserts that
increased engagement and communication with NSAGs can lead
to "increased information sharing and understanding of problems
on both sides," which in turn increases the likelihood of a
successful peace process. 49 It is logical that any peace process or
ceasefire agreement should, by necessity, include all actors to the
armed conflict, including the NSAGs involved in the conflict.
States and NSAGs have expressed concerns about any process
of engagement.so NSAGs fear that they are more susceptible to
Security as a Source of Stress and Distress: Is Psychological Support Needed?, 23(4)
REFUGEE SURV. Q. 152 (2004).
45 See Thomas, supra note 44, at 157 (noting the increasingly dangerous
environment and susceptibility to attacks faced by "military, peacekeepers, journalists,
and disaster relief workers").
46 See Hofmann, supra note 9, at 397. For information on DDR programs, see
What is DDR?, UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION,
http://www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
47 ANKI SJOBERG, A GLOBAL REPORT ON MINE ACTION BY ARMED NON-STATE
ACTORS: SOME PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 5 (2006),
http://www.genevacall.org/resources/research/f-research/2001-2010/gc-2006-18sep-
greportp.pdf.
48 For example, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) is now
part of the Government of National Unity; the Conseil National pour la Dffense de la
Ddmocratie-Forces pour la D6fense de la Ddmocratie (CNDD-FDD) forms part of
Burundi's national government. As mentioned earlier, GAM has formed part of
Indonesia's government. See GRAVINGHOLT ET AL., supra note 2, at 93 (discussing the
transformation of NSAGs into a legitimate "state actor" after elections, such as Hamas
and Somalia's NSAG structure).
49 Hofmann, supra note 9, at 406.




intelligence-gathering and surveillance if they engage with the
government." They also might question the government's
motives and believe that the government might use the
engagement as "part of a counter-insurgency or low-intensity
conflict scheme to disarm them."5 2 Some governments have
argued that engaging NSAGs in a formal dialogue might give
"legitimacy, recognition, and status of belligerency" to armed
groups.5 3 States may be concerned that engaging with the NSAG
increases the NSAG's credibility by signaling that the armed
group has legitimate grievances.54 Furthermore, government
officials may argue that according NSAGs legal personality and
responsibilities makes state sovereignty increasingly irrelevant.5
While concerns by both governments and NSAGs are valid, a
number of counter-arguments should be noted. First, applying
IHL to the conduct of all parties of an internal armed conflict does
not legitimize the armed groups. This view is clearly stated in
IHL instruments and supported by legal scholars.56 Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which is considered
customary law," explicitly states that the application of norms to
a party does not "affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict."" Therefore, holding the armed groups to IHL
obligations does not give them any entitlements to use violence or





54 See Hofmann, supra note 9, at 397-98; see also ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 46 (2006) (discussing criticism by some
that holding NSAGs to international laws "may seem to legitimize the use of violence by
both sides").
55 See CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 25-26; see generally GRAVINGHOLT ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 10-11 (discussing the risks and factors third parties should consider
before engaging with NSAGs).
56 See, e.g., CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 51; see also SANTOS, supra note 50, at 12-
13. Part II will discuss the IHL instruments and their application to NSAGs in more
detail.
57 See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 7 (analyzing customary
international humanitarian law).
58 Id
59 See SANTOS, supra note 50, at 12-13; CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 51.
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There are also incentives for governments and NSAGs to
respect and ensure compliance with the provisions of IHL. 0 As
Heather Wilson notes, "[c]lemency is often in the interests of the
victor as much as to the benefit of the vanquished.",6  Wilson
argues that it is in parties' interests to follow certain standards of
warfare as there is a threat of retaliation. 62 Reports by Geneva Call
from interviews with leaders of NSAGs support this hypothesis.63
Informants have often been directly affected by landmines or
witnessed the devastating effects of armed conflict on civilian
populations. 64  Additionally, NSAGs may increase their internal
and international credibility by following the norms of IHL.65
Santos argues that adherence to certain IHL provisions is
important for an NSAG that has aspirations to become part of or
take over a government, as these actions demonstrate
responsibility.6 6
Furthermore, there are advantages to using international law as
opposed to national law when regulating the actions of NSAGs
during internal armed conflict. NSAGs are often in disagreement
with the state-particularly when the NSAG is engaged in armed
conflict against the state-and NSAGs are therefore unlikely to
accept the legitimacy of the national laws created by that state.
As the Council on Human Rights Policy explains, "National law is
tainted by its association with the state or government in power.
International law, even though it is developed by states, has the
advantage of being distinct from any particular state."68 This is
not to suggest that NSAGs will accept the legitimacy of
international law in all cases; however, evidence shows that many
60 See HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 36 (1988).
61 Id
62 See id.
63 GENEVA CALL, 2 ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS AND LANDMINES: A GLOBAL
REPORT OF NSA MINE ACTION 11-14 (2006), available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/27A698CFDE5477BOC125724200
4FB614-genevacall-landmines-nov2006.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
64 See id. at 11.
65 See id. at 13.
66 See SANTOS, supra note 50, at 14.




NSAGs have voluntarily complied with provisions of IHL.6 9 As
the next section will illustrate, the work of humanitarian
organizations, such as Geneva Call and the ICRC, have
demonstrated the benefits of dialogue with NSAGs for civilian
populations living in armed conflict areas."o
C. The Nature ofArmed Conflict and Non-State Armed
Groups
As noted earlier, the majority of armed conflict today is
internal and involves one or more NSAGs." Along with
government forces, NSAGs contribute to the deaths of thousands
of civilians every year.72 NSAGs are responsible for a range of
violent acts, including deliberately targeting civilians, destroying
civilian property, and committing rape and other forms of sexual
violence, as well as indiscriminate violent attacks that completely
disregard IHL and international human rights law (IHRL).73
While NSAGs are certainly a reality of today's world, it should
not be assumed that they are new actors in armed conflict.7 4
Rather, NSAGs have participated in armed conflict throughout
history." Although the occurrence of internal armed conflict has
69 Refer to Part III.D and Part IV.A for examples of special agreements and
unilateral declarations voluntarily undertaken by NSAGs. Furthermore, the attendance
by eleven National Liberation Movements (NLMs) at the drafting of the Additional
Protocols of 1977 was initiated by the NSAGs themselves. See Claude Pilloud & Jean
De Preux, Introduction to International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the
Additional Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 (1987),
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750001?OpenDocument.
70 See infra Part IV. To provide a few examples: NSAGs have agreed to ban the
use of mines, facilitated humanitarian assistance and access, allowed visits to prisoners,
incorporated IHL provisions into military training and codes, and made unilateral
declarations to abide by IHL provisions.
71 See ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 1-2.
72 See id. at 2.
73 See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 8 U.N.
Doc. S/1999/957 (Sept. 1999).
74 Bangerter, supra note 3, at 75.
75 See, e.g., id. at 75 (noting that King David participated in guerrilla warfare in the
Desert of Judea, and the Ming dynasty, which ruled China from 1368-1644, began as an
armed group revolting against the Yuan Mongol dynasty); IAN F.W. BECKETT, MODERN
INSURGENCIES AND COUNTER-INSURGENCIES: GUERRILLAS AND THEIR OPPONENTS SINCE
1750 1 (2001) (providing examples ofNSAGs active in armed conflict since the fifteenth
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increased since World War II, the incidence of international armed
conflict has decreased.7 6 The increase of internal armed conflict
coincides with an increase in the involvement of NSAGs in armed
conflict, making NSAGs the "dominant face of modem warfare."n
Santos identifies three shifts of NSAG involvement in armed
conflict involving three distinct periods: Cold War, post-Cold War
to pre-9/1 1, and post-9/1 1.78 Between the 1940s and the 1970s,
the "classic revolutionary guerrilla groups" were the dominant
form of NSAGs, which were based around ideological movements
that aimed to seize political power. 79 Beckett supports this claim,
noting that ideologies of nationalism and communism motivated
armed groups in the immediate post-1945 period." There were
also many secessionist movements of ethnic or religious minorities
during this period." According to Ewumbue-Monono, between
1955 and 1976, a large number of NSAGs formed in Africa as
liberation movements.8 2
Armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, often referred to as a
period of "new wars," consisted of civil wars that differed from
conventional inter-state wars. During this period, NSAGs had
greater access to small arms, light weapons and modern
communications, and they were "less ideological, less disciplined,
less trained in combat, less formal, but more pragmatic,
resembling 'social bandits."' 84  Ewumbue-Monono asserts that a
century); C.E. CALLWELL, SMALL WARS. THEIR PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 22 (1906)
(providing numerous examples of NSAGs' involvement in armed conflict in the
nineteenth century).
76 Santos, Agreement on Respect for Human Rights, supra note 12, at 177.
77 Id.; see also RODERIC ALLEY, INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 1 (2004) ("From the end of World War II until 2000, over sixteen million
perished through internal wars, compared to three and a half million from interstate
wars.").
78 Santos, Agreement on Respect for Human Rights, supra note 12, at 177.
79 Id. at 177-78.
80 BECKETT, supra note 75, at vii.
8 1 Santos, Agreement on Respect for Human Rights, supra note 12, at 178.
82 C. Ewumbue-Monono, Respect for International Humanitarian Law by Armed
Non-State Actors in Africa, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 864, 906 (2006) (noting that
NSAGs emerged in States such as Algeria, Kenya, Cameroon, the Portuguese territories
of Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique, and the French territory of Djibouti).
83 See GRAVINGHOLT ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.
84 Santos, Agreement on Respect for Human Rights, supra note 12, at 178; see also
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new type of conflict arose in Africa in the 1990s that was based on
identity and fought between ethnic militias, such as the Mai Mai
(DRC), Interahamwe (Rwanda), Kamajors (Sierra Leone) and
Janjaweed (Darfur, Sudan)."
According to Santos, the post-9/11 period is marked by
increased activity of Islamist NSAGs fighting against the U.S.-led
"global war on terror."86 Since 9/11, world attention has focused
on terrorist networks and NSAGs that tend to operate in "highly
dispersed and autonomous but somehow well-coordinated and
resourced small unit cells."" This section very briefly outlines the
role of NSAGs in armed conflict throughout history. The next part
of this comment argues that, despite the long history of NSAGs in
armed conflict, IHL developed almost entirely with a focus on
states. It concludes that IHL must refocus on NSAGs, as they will
continue to play an active role in armed conflict in the future."
III. International Humanitarian Law Applied to Non-
State Armed Groups
A. Overview ofInternational Humanitarian Law
This section provides an analysis of the conventional and
customary sources of IHL that regulate the actions of NSAGs.
The analysis focuses on the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in
particular, Common Article 3, the two Additional Protocols of
1977, and several other multilateral treaties. It also includes an
examination of other legal instruments, such as special
agreements, which have been used successfully to accommodate
NSAGs under IHL. The analysis demonstrates that IHL struggles
to keep pace with the reality of today's armed conflict and the role
GRAVINGHOLT ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (discussing the post-Cold War "new wars":
"[t]ypical now is the privatazation of armed groups, the economization of motives for
using force, the brutalization of strategies of violence and the criminalization of
economies of violence. The change in the form that war takes is accompanied by the rise
of new kinds of armed groups.").
85 Ewumbue-Monono, supra note 82, at 906.
86 Santos, Agreement on Respect for Human Rights, supra note 12, at 178.
87 Id.
88 Bangerter, supra note 3, at 75 (noting that NSAGs will "remain active for the
foreseeable future" and nothing in academic literature contradicts this prediction).
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of NSAGs. 89 As a result, people living in areas of internal armed
conflict suffer from the actions of NSAGs and are not afforded a
similar level of protection as those living in areas of international
armed conflict. 90
This section begins with a brief overview of the basic
principles of IHL. IHL "aims to restrict the methods and scope of
warfare through treaties and customs that limit the use of violence
in armed conflict and protect civilians and persons who are no
longer participating in hostilities."" The basic principles of IHL
are distinction, proportionality, necessity, and the prohibition on
inflicting unnecessary suffering or attacks on those who are hors
de combat.9 2 The importance of IHL principles and their
customary nature is often described by referring to the Martens
Clause.93 This clause, introduced by a Russian delegate at the
1899 Hague Peace Conference, provides that "civilians and
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the
principles of international law derived from established custom,
from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public
conscience."9 4 According to Antonio Cassese, accomplished
89 See generally ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 14-15 (addressing the changes in IHL
regarding NSAGs).
90 See generally LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 2-3
(2002) (discussing the different protections for civilians living in areas of internal armed
conflict and international conflict).
91 1 MARCO SASS6LI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?
CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 81 (2d ed. 2006).
92 Id.; see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 414-17 (2d ed. 2005); see also
Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (Hors de combat are "persons
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid
down their arms and those placed hors de combat [out of combat] by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause."). Geneva Convention 11 for the Amerlioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
93 See generally CASSESE, supra note 92, at 161 (discussing the Martens Clause and
customary law).
94 The clause appears in the preambles of Hague Convention No. 11 of 1899, Hague
Convention No. IV of 1907, and of the 1980 U.N. Weapons Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons. It also appears in articles
63/62/142/158, respectively, of the four Geneva Conventions, and art. 1(2) of Protocol I.
Similar wording appears in the preamble of paragraph 4 of Protocol II, but there is no
reference to established custom.
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Italian jurist, the "[Martens Clause] puts the 'laws of humanity'
and the 'dictates of public conscience' on the same footing as the
'usages of States' (that is, State practice) as historical sources of
'principles of international law."' 95 The clause encapsulates the
importance of customary law in IHL.96
The majority of IHL is codified in treaties, in particular, the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols
of 1977." "Governments also adopted a series of treaties
governing the conduct of hostilities: The Declaration of St.
Petersburg of 1868, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and
the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which bans the use of chemical and
bacteriological weapons." 98 In more recent years, states have
agreed to a number of treaties, including the 1954 Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
(and its 1999 Protocol), the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons of 1980,99 and the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition
of Anti-Personnel Landmines of 1997.100 The 1998 Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) also contains IHL
provisions.ot
From a humanitarian perspective, IHL should place the same
restrictions and obligations on all parties to the conflict. This is to
95 CASSESE, supra note 92, at 161.
96 Disagreement exists over the interpretation of the Martens Clause. See generally
Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 INT'L REV.
RED CROSS (1997) (noting that more than one interpretation of the Martens Clause
exists).
97 It is generally agreed that modem IHL was born in 1864 with the adoption of the
First Geneva Convention. The next three Geneva Conventions followed in 1906, 1929,
and 1949. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
their Additional Protocols (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-
law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm.
98 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW at ix (Jean-Marie Henckaerts
& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
99 Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons, Oct. 10, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-25, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137.
100 U.N. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 1.L.M.
1507.
101 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*
(July 17, 1998). Text versions of all conventions are also available at
http://www.icrc.org.
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ensure that victims, who are not responsible for the use of force
and who are affected by conflict, receive the same level of
protection-regardless of whether the conflict is internal or
international. In other words, IHL should treat parties in armed
conflict equally.10 2 Yet, IHL has developed with a distinction
between international and non-international armed conflict since
the Geneva Conventions of 1949." This is evident by the
creation of two Additional Protocols to the Conventions, one that
deals solely with international armed conflict (Protocol I) and the
other with non-international armed conflict (Protocol II).104 As
will be demonstrated in the following section, the rules contain
substantial differences in their requirements and application.
B. International Legal Personality ofNon-State Armed
Groups
The question of legal personality is often unclear and
complicated for NSAGs. The increasing role of NSAGs in both
domestic and international affairs, especially in armed conflict,
highlights the importance of determining the legal personality of
NSAGs.'" Clapham argues that international lawyers recognize
that NSAGs are important, but they "feel constrained by the
'rules' on subjectivity to develop a framework to explain the rights
and duties of non-state actors under international law." 06
It should not be assumed that states have always been the sole
actors to legitimately wage war. The origin of the state system is
generally traced to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.107 War
existed before the Peace of Westphalia and before states were
102 SASS6LI & BOUVIER, supra note 91, at 108-09.
103 MOIR, supra note 90, at 2-3.
104 SASS6LI & BOUVIER, supra note 91, at 249 (stating that, in practice, IHL is
generally applied ex post facto by a court or tribunal. States do not determine if a
conflict is international or domestic at the time of the conflict.).
105 See generally CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 60-61 (addressing the distinctive legal
nature of NSAGs).
106 Id.
107 The Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648. The peace
treaties are generally used as markers of the modern international system. See Claire
Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and
Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27(2) REV. OF INT'L STUDIES 133-35 (2001).
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placed at the center of authority.' 8 From the middle of the twelfth
century to the late thirteenth century, canonists, inspired by
Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, engaged in debate on
who had legitimate authority to wage war-whether the right
belonged to a pope, emperor, or feudal lord.'09 Wilson argues that
beginning in the sixteenth century, sovereign states "gradually
asserted a monopoly on the use of violence both within their
borders and against other sovereigns" and that this monopoly on
force was fully recognized by the nineteenth century. 10
Nevertheless, Wilson argues that in recent years, the idea that
states are the sole legitimate authority to use force has been
questioned."'
While states have been at the center of the international legal
system since the Westphalian Peace Treaties of 1648, there are
many examples of NSAGs and other non-state actors that were
accorded with legal personality. For example, many of the earliest
treaties outlawing piracy" 2 and slaveryl' were directed at private
parties. Individuals were held responsible in both the 1948
Genocide Conventionll 4 and the Nuremberg Tribunal established
at the end of World War II."s As early as 1948, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) acknowledged the importance of non-state
actors when it stated that "the progressive increase in the
collective action of states has already given rise to instances of
action upon the international plane by certain entities which are
108 id at 135.
109 WILSON, supra note 60, at 14-15. These dates coincided with Gratian's
Decretum and Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theological.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 16.
112 The right to capture pirates, regardless of nationality, and the obligation of all
individuals to refrain from piracy are two of the earliest rules established in international
law, dating back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Many scholars argue that
international rules on piracy imposed direct obligations on individuals. See CASSESE,
supra note 92, at 143-44.
113 For example, the Slavery Convention of 1926 provides that forced labor is only
permissible if administered by the government, not a private citizen. The 1956
Supplementary Convention makes slavery a criminal offense, and private persons are
liable for "severe penalties." See LYAL SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 90 (1992).
114 ZEGVELD,supra note 18, at 108.
115 Id. at 106-08.
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not States." 1 l6 Along with the term "High Contracting Parties,"
which generally refers to states, the term "powers" was used in the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949."' Furthermore, Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions pertains to "each Party to the
conflict," including states and NSAGs."
State practice demonstrates that actors governing a specific
territory are treated as partial subjects of international law.l 9
These actors with state-like qualities include "de facto regimes,
insurgents recognized as belligerents, national liberation
movements (NLMs) ... the Holy See, and even the Order of
Malta."' 20 A number of court rulings also confirm that NSAGs
have legal rights and duties under IHL.12 ' In 2004, the Appeals
Chamber of the Sierra Leone Special Court held that "it is well
settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-
state actors, are bound by international humanitarian law, even
though only states may become parties to international treaties." 1 22
Similarly, the ICJ ruled that law applicable to non-international
(internal) armed conflict also binds all parties to a conflict. 123
A difficult aspect of examining NSAGs' obligations under IHL
is the fact that NSAGs are not parties to the treaties that bind them.
Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions refers to "High
116 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 178 (Apr. 11).
117 Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 refers to the "Powers
which are party." According to the commentary on the Conventions, the drafters of the
Conventions intended for the term "Powers" to be limited to states; however, the term
leaves room for an interpretation that may include NSAGs. See INT'L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf (follow "1949 Conventions & Additional Protocols, & their
Commentaries" hyperlink) [hereinafter ICRC Commentary].
118 Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 7.
119 See, e.g., CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 59 (addressing the treatment of NSAGs as
if they have the qualities of a state).
120 Id.; see CASSESE, supra note 92, at 126; WILSON, supra note 60, at 26-27.
121 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E),
Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), T 22
(May 31, 2004).
122 Id
123 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 114, T 218-19 (June 27).
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Contracting Parties," 24 and Articles 20 and 22 of Protocol II
stipulate that only the parties to the Geneva Conventions can
become parties to the Protocol. 25 Cassese argues that Articles 34
to 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which are
customary law, provide that treaties may impose rights and
obligations on third parties, even if the third party is not formally a
party to the treaty. 2 6 11 should be noted that a number of NSAGs
attempted to become parties to the Geneva Conventions and other
IHL instruments, but certain states such as Switzerland, the
depository of the Conventions, rejected their requests.127
According to Eric David, the legal grounds for binding NSAGs
to IHL are very simple:
The legal answer is straightforward: the State is bound by the
rule and the State includes not only the government but also the
entire population that is made up of individuals and groups.
Whether these groups are rebels or insurgents is irrelevant. As a
component of the State, they are bound by the rule that binds the
State. That is why international humanitarian law is applicable
to these movements.128
Liesbeth Zegveld, a professor of public international law at the
University of Leiden, identifies a number of weaknesses to this
conception of the international legal status of NSAGs.129  She
argues that this explanation implies that the relationship between
the established government and the armed groups is
hierarchical.' For the most part, however, NSAGs challenge the
authority and the laws of the established government.' 3 ' Zegveld
124 Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 58.
125 Protocol 11, supra note 8, arts. 20 & 22.
126 CASSESE, supra note 92, at 129-30.
127 ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 14 (noting also that several armed groups have
unsuccessfully attempted to adhere to the Geneva Conventions; for example, the
Provisional Revolutionary Government of Algeria, the Smith government in Rhodesia,
and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)).
128 Eric David, IHL and Non-State Actors: Synopsis of the Issue, 27 COLLEGIUM 27,
35 (2003).
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asserts that NSAGs are different from individuals, who "derive
rights and obligations" through the state.'32 NSAGs, under
Common Article 3 and Protocol II, assume several obligations as
groups to comply with IHL, and these obligations exceed those
placed on individuals.'3 1 In summary, NSAGs create both
complex legal and political challenges to international
relationships and IHL. The next two sections will analyze
customary and conventional IHL principles that are applicable to
NSAGs.
C. Customary International Humanitarian Law
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is one of the
most relevant sources of IHL applicable to NSAGs.13 4 With 194
parties, there is little disagreement that the Geneva Conventions,
including Common Article 3, bind all states regardless of whether
they are parties to the Conventions. '" The JCJ has stated that the
Geneva Conventions, including Common Article 3, were
principles of customary law.' 36  Furthermore, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) declared that
Common Article 3 has become a part of customary law, and its
IHL provisions apply to the parties."
Protocol II, which applies to non-international armed conflict,
does not include a reference to custom, while Protocol I-dealing
with international conflict-does.138 Commentary on the preamble
132 Id
'33 Id.
134 See generally Jean-Marie Henckaerts, The Grave Breaches Regime as
Customary International Law, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 683, 686 (2009) (discussing the
Geneva Conventions as customary law).
135 Id
136 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Reports, 79 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons case]; see Prosecutor v. Tadid,
Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, 98 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, T 608 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
Sept. 2, 1998).
137 Statute of the Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,
1994), available at http://www.un.org/ictr/english/Resolutions/955e.htm; see also
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 608; Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, at 98.
138 Protocol I, supra note 8, art. I, $ 2 ("[C]ivilians and combatants remain under the
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of Protocol 1I justifies the omission of any reference to custom by
arguing that "the attempt to establish rules for non-international
armed conflict only goes back to 1949 and that the application of
Common Article 3 in the practice of States has not developed in
such a way that one could speak of 'established custom' regarding
non-international conflict."13 9  The ICRC commentary on the
preamble of Protocol II argues that customary norms in internal
armed conflict do exist.14 0 It states, for example, respect for and
protection of the wounded exists "[i]rrespective of the
qualification of conflict as an internal or international conflict."l41
The commentary continues: "This is shown by the Lieber Code, as
it was developed for a civil war, based on the existing principles of
the laws of war. In their turn the negotiators of the 1899 and 1907
Conventions did not hesitate to seek inspiration from it." 4 2
Furthermore, international bodies provide evidence that various
provisions of Protocol II are considered customary law. In Tadi6,
the ICTY stated, "Many provisions of this Protocol can now be
regarded as declaratory of existing rules or as having crystallized
emerging rules of customary law or else as having been strongly
instrumental in their evolution as general principles."'4 3 In
Prosecutor v. Kordi6 and Others, the ICTY referred to Article
13(2) of Protocol II, regarding unlawful attacks on civilians, as
customary law. 144
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established
custom.").
139 M. BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 620 (1982).
140 See Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 12, August 1949, in ICRC Commentary, supra note 117.
141 Id.
142 Id
143 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision of the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal in Jurisdiction, 1 117; see also ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 19-
21 (asserting that the Tribunal did not specify which provisions were to be considered
customary law). Zegveld also argues that the tribunal was referring to the provisions of
Protocol II that overlap with the norms of Common Article 3.
144 Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, Decision on the Joint
Defence Motion to Dismiss the Amended Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on
the Limited Jurisdictonal Reach of Articles 2 and 3, 30 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 2, 1999), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic/tdec/en/90302DC56323.htm. The Tribunal ruled that
"while both Protocols [1 and II] have not yet achieved the near universal participation
enjoyed by the Geneva Conventions, it is not controversial that major parts of both
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In 2005, the ICRC released a study that identified 161 rules of
customary international humanitarian law.145 A number of
important conclusions can be drawn from the study. First, many
IHL principles and rules, in treaties not yet universally ratified,
exist as customary law. The report found that the "gaps" in the
regulation of the conduct of hostilities "have largely been filled
through state practice."' 4 6 More specifically, "[s]tate practice has
gone beyond existing treaty law and expanded the rules applicable
to [internal] armed conflicts."'4 7 Therefore, the legal framework
for internal armed conflict is extended by customary law. This
extension means that states that have not ratified the Additional
Protocols, for example, would still be bound by many of their
provisions because those provisions have become customary
law.'48 Second, the authors of the study found that many of the
customary rules and norms of IHL should apply to both
international and internal armed conflict.'49 This finding suggests
that a conflict's legal qualification, whether international or
internal, should be less relevant in applying customary IHL.
One scholar, Clapham, argues that parties to an internal armed
conflict, regardless of recognition by the state or a third party,
have certain obligations.'s He asserts that "recognition regimes
have been replaced by compulsory rules of international
humanitarian law which apply when the fighting reaches certain
thresholds.""' As this section demonstrates, NSAGs are
accountable to certain provisions of IHL. Many of these
obligations stem from customary laws, such as those identified by
the ICRC study and the establishment of the customary nature of
Common Article 3 and certain provisions of Protocol I.' 52 Many
Protocols reflect customary law."
145 See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 98, at ix.
146 Id. at xxix.
147 Id
148 This is true of the Geneva Conventions, which became "widely accepted as part
of customary international law," and are therefore binding on all states, "irrespective of
any formal accession." See CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 119 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
I49 See id.
150 See id at 272.
151 Id.
152 See id.; see also I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note
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areas of IHL have not reached customary status, so it is necessary
to examine conventional law to determine the full extent of
NSAGs' legal obligations and rights during internal armed
conflict.
D. Conventional International Humanitarian Law
This section examines the legal rights and duties applicable to
non-state actors through conventional IHL. While there is debate
over the legal ground on which NSAGs may derive rights and
obligations from treaties, this section demonstrates that certain
international conventions are applicable to the actions of NSAGs.
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions states that "the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of
the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them."' Only states can be parties to the
Conventions, so the Conventions only have limited applicability to
armed conflict between states.154 The one exception to the scope
of the application of the Conventions is found in Common Article
3 of the four Conventions, which extends the scope of protection
to those involved in armed conflict "not of an international
character."' 5
While clearly stating that the legal status of parties to the
conflict is not affected, Common Article 3 provides: "In the case
of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions. . . ."' The provisions prohibit violence, cruel
treatment, torture, taking of hostages, degrading treatment, and
sentences without judgment by a regular court to "[p]ersons taking
no active part in the hostilities" or those that have "laid down their
arms.""' The provisions also hold each party responsible for
98, at ix.
153 Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 7, art. 3.
154 Consider, for example, when a State engaged in armed conflict has not ratified a
Convention. That State will not be bound by the Convention's terms.
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collecting and caring for "[t]he wounded and sick."'"' The final
part of Common Article 3 stipulates that parties to the conflict
"should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present
Convention."' 5 9 While this does not legally obligate parties to
create special agreements, it encourages parties to do so.
The provisions of Common Article 3, described as a
"convention in miniature," were seen as landmark in the
development of IHL."'6 While Common Article 3 brings internal
wars into the scope of international law and places responsibilities
and limitations on NSAGs,16 ' the provisions of Common Article 3
do not offer the same level of protection as the full Geneva
Conventions. As Wilson points out, "Article 3 does not prevent
the established government from punishing the rebels under
municipal law, nor does it change their status in law."l 62
Furthermore, Common Article 3 is limited to the protection of
"persons taking no active part in the hostilities." 6 3 Therefore, it
does not prohibit certain weapons or methods of warfare found in
international armed conflict. Additionally, there is no agreed-upon
definition of "armed conflict not of an international character," 64
which results in states interpreting Common Article 3 very
broadly.165
While some states question the applicability of Common
Article 3 to armed opposition groups, international practice
suggests its applicability is sound. In Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua, the ICJ held that law
applicable to armed conflict not of an international character,
including Common Article 3, was binding against the NSAGs in
Nicaragua known as the "contras."l 66 The court referred to the
158 Id.art.3, 2.
159 Id.
160 See WILSON, supra note 60, at 43-44.
161 See id. at 43.
162 Id. at 44.
163 Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 7, art. 3.
164 Id
165 See WILSON, supra note 60, at 45-46.
166 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 219 (June 27). The Contras generally referred to two NSAGs:
Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN) and Alianza Revolucionario Democratica
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provisions in Article 3 as "a minimum yardstick" that reflected
"elementary considerations of humanity.""' In a similar ruling,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ruled in the
Tablada case that "Common Article 3's mandatory provisions
expressly bind and apply equally to both parties to internal
conflicts, i.e., government and dissident forces."'6 8 The court
found the obligation to apply Common Article 3 as "absolute" and
equal for both the Argentine armed forces and the Movimiento
Todos por la Patria (MTP), an NSAG that attacked an army base
in La Tablada.16 9 Similarly, in both the Rwanda and Yugoslavia
Tribunals, the court declared that Common Article 3 has become a
part of customary law and its IHL provisions applied to the parties
to the armed conflict.o70
Another criticism of Common Article 3 is the inconsistent
record of the application of its provisions."' This is largely due to
both a lack of political will and the desire of states to deal with
internal armed conflict domestically. 172  There are a number of
weaknesses of Common Article 3 that add to the difficulty of its
application. First, there is no designated authority to decide if a
conflict falls under the scope of Common Article 3."7 Since
Common Article 3 automatically applies to internal conflict
without any state recognition of the conflict, one party to a conflict
may think that it should apply while another party may not.174 In
(ARDE).
167 Id. 218 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168 Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/I1.98, doc. 6 rev. 174 (1998) (emphasis omitted).
169 See id; see also ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 10.
170 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal for Jurisdiction, 1 98; see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 608. The ICTR is specifically charged with
applying Common Article 3 to prosecute individuals who have committed serious
violations. Statute of the Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,1994).
171 See CASSESE, supra note 92, at 432.
172 See id at 429-30.
173 See ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 13 ("[D]etermination of applicability of
Common Article 3 and Protocol II is largely left to auto-interpretation.").
174 See CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 275. For example, NLMs will often apply
Common Article 3, while the opposing State will refuse to recognize a Common Article
3 situation and instead will treat the rebels as criminals.
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practice, the application of Common Article 3 has been limited."17
Article 3 was officially recognized "in Guatemala (1954 and
1994), Algeria (after 1956), Lebanon (1958), Yemen (1962-[6]7),
the Dominican Republic (1965), Vietnam (after 1965), Nigeria
(1967-70), Chile (1971), Uruguay (1972), and the Portuguese
territories in Africa after 1974.""171
On the other hand, there are numerous examples of parties to
armed conflict refusing to apply Common Article 3. For example,
the United Kingdom was "unwilling to admit the applicability" of
Common Article 3 in Malaya and Cyprus. 177  This same
unwillingness was exhibited by the Portuguese in Angola and
Mozambique, as well as in the armed conflicts in Pakistan and
Ceylon. 17 8 Similar resistance came from Kenya (1954), Algeria
(before 1956), Malaysia (1956), Indochina (1957-65), Northern
Ireland (from 1971), the Philippines (from 1972), Afghanistan
(from 1981), El Salvador (after 1983), and Chechnya (1994-95).179
E. Additional Protocols I and II of 1977
Expanding on the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Additional
Protocols I and II were drafted simultaneously from 1974 to 1977
to increase the protection of victims during hostilities.so The
Additional Protocols of 1977 have not yet achieved the universal
acceptance of the Geneva Conventions, nor have the Protocols
achieved the status of customary international law.1 '
Nevertheless, many of the Additional Protocols' provisions are
declaratory of customary international law.'82 As noted earlier,
Protocol I is applicable to international armed conflict, and
Protocol II is applicable to non-international (internal) armed
conflict.18 1
175 See RENt PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW
268 (2002).
176 Id
177 WILSON, supra note 60, at 47.
178 See id.
179 See PROVOST, supra note 175, at 268.
180 See MOIR, supra note 90, at 89.
181 See CASSESE, supra note 92, at 432-33.
182 See discussion supra Part III.C.
183 See discussion supra Part III.A.
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Article 1(4) of Protocol I elevates certain wars of national
liberation to the status of international armed conflict.18 4
Supplementing Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, Article 1(4)
includes armed conflict "in which peoples are fighting against
colonial and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination."' Cassese, in his
comprehensive book on international law, describes this definition
of NLMs as "restricted," as it only includes three categories of
conflict."' NLMs recognized by regional organizations were
invited as observers to the drafting of the Additional Protocols.'
Furthermore, Article 96(3)' of Additional Protocol I states:
The authority representing a people engaged against a High
Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in
Article 1, paragraph 4, may undertake to apply the Conventions
and this Protocol in relation to that conflict by means of a
184 See Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 1, 4.
185 Id.
186 See Antonio Cassese, The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 416, 417 (1981). The three
"categories" in Article 1(4) "include armed conflicts in which people are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes." Protocol 1, supra
note 8, art. 1, 4. There is some discussion as to whether Article 1(4) is limited to the
three categories, or whether the drafters were merely providing three examples of types
of armed conflict. See ICRC Commentary, supra note 117, T 108 ("[Olne delegation
considered that in interpreting the word 'include' literally [in Article 4(1)], the list
following it is not exhaustive.").
187 According to Henckaerts, this was a "unique situation" that would be hard to
repeat today given the vast number of armed groups and the difficulty in determining
which groups would be invited. Furthermore, Henckaerts argues that the codification of
IHL is almost complete, and therefore, another conference of this nature would be
unlikely. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Binding Armed Opposition Groups Through
Humanitarian Treaty Law and Customary Law, 27 COLLEGIUM 123, 128 (2003).
188 Eight nations issued reservations pertaining to this Article (Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, Spain, and the United Kingdom).
Many of these reservations expressed the importance of recognition by the U.N. or an
intergovernmental organization of the group making the declaration (including Belgium,
Canada, Ireland, and the Republic of Korea). Other states declared that the group
making the declaration must meet the requirements of Article 1(4) (France and the
United Kingdom). Germany and Spain, while emphasizing certain components of the
Article, did not attempt any modifications. Julie Gaudreau, The Reservations to the
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 849
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 143, 150 (2003).
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unilateral declaration addressed to the depositary.189
This provision leaves room for the accession of armed groups
that meet the requirements of Article 1(4) to the Protocol. In
practice, however, no party has applied Article 96(3) yet. 90
Some lawyers argue that international bodies should apply
Protocol I to the obligations of parties in non-international conflict
as Protocol I provides more specific rules and regulations than
Protocol II.191 Protocol I includes over 100 articles, whereas
Protocol II includes only twenty-eight. Zegveld asserts that the
realities of internal armed conflict are complex and the "few and
simple" provisions of Common Article 3 and Protocol II are
insufficient. 92 For this reason, the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I guide international bodies when interpreting and
applying IHL to internal armed conflict.' 93 The U.N. Commission
on Human Rights suggested that Protocol II may be applied to
armed opposition groups.194  The ICTY recognized that the
distinction between internal and international armed conflict is
"losing its value as far as human beings are concerned." 95 The
189 The article continues:
Such declaration shall, upon its receipt by the depositary, have in relation to that
conflict the following effects: (a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought
into force for the said authority as a Party to the conflict with immediate effect;
(b) The said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which
have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this
Protocol; and (c) The Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon
all Parties to the conflict.
Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 96, 3.
190 While some NLMs such as the African National Congress (ANC) have made
Article 96(3) declarations, "no such Declarations are listed by the Depository or have
been transmitted to the High Contracting Parties." Noelle Higgins, The Regulation of
Armed Non-State Actors: Promoting the Application of the Laws of War to Conflicts
Involving National Liberation Movements, 17 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 12, 14 (2009) (citations
omitted); see also CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 273 (explaining that the Depository refers
to the Swiss Federal Council).
191 For example, Zegveld notes that international bodies apply the more detailed
regulations of Protocol I "to overcome the lacunae of Protocol II." ZEGVELD, supra note
18, at 77. For further discussion of this argument, see id at 33-38, 76-84.
192 Id. at 34.
193 See id. at 34.
194 See id. at 11.




Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape,
torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches,
museums or private property, as well as proscribe weapons
causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are
engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or
providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted
"only" within the territory of a sovereign State? If international
law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of
States, must gradually turn to the protection of the human
beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy
should gradually lose its weight.19 6
Sass6li supports the claim that rules regulating internal armed
conflict "[have] been drawing closer" to those of international
armed conflict.1 97 He provides the following evidence:
The jurisprudence of the two ad hoc international criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda which have a
very expansive view of customary international law; in the
crimes defined in the Statute of the International Criminal Court;
by States' acceptance of the fact that both categories of conflicts
are covered by the same rules in recent treaties on weapons and
cultural objects; the growing influence of international human
rights law; and the ICRC's very optimistic assessment of
customary IHL.198
There is a clear trend in international practice to apply IHL
equally to international and internal armed conflict.1 99 While the
relevance of the distinction between internal and international
armed conflict seems to be diminishing, it is not absolute.2 0 0 As
the ICTY noted, not all rules and principles of international armed
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 97.
196 Id.
197 Sass6li, supra note 29, at 14.
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conflict have been extended to internal armed conflict; although
the "general essence" of those rules may be applied to internal
armed conflict, the "detailed regulation" is not applicable.20 1 Since
there are divergent and unclear opinions regarding the application
of Protocol I to internal armed conflict, it is necessary to examine
Protocol II in detail to determine what rules definitely apply to
NSAGs during an internal armed conflict.
F. Additional Protocol II
Protocol II further develops the general provisions of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in regulating internal armed
conflict, and the provisions of Protocol II contain much more
detail than Common Article 3.202 In practice, however, several
shortcomings limit Protocol II's applicability to internal armed
conflict. 203  Protocol II includes a definition of non-international
armed conflict in Article 1:
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without
modifying its existing conditions of application, shall apply to
all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic
acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being
201 Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 126.
202 See Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol II: Scope and History, 33 AM. U. L. REv.
29, 35 (1983). The impact of the development is also readily apparent just by comparing
the length of the two instruments.





The scope of Protocol II's applicability is narrower than that of
Common Article 3. Common Article 3 refers only to "the case of
armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." 20 5 This definition
does not require that armed groups fight against the government of
the territory in which operations are conducted.20 6 Instead, it
covers armed conflict between armed groups or between an armed
group and the state outside the territory of the armed group.207
Protocol II only applies to armed conflict that has reached a
certain threshold of intensity. 208 Article 1 requires that the conflict
must exist between the government and its armed forces or
"organized armed groups," which "under responsible command,"
control enough of the territory to carry out "sustained and
concerted military operations." 209  Paragraph 2 of Article 1
specifically excludes the application of Protocol II to "situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature." 2 10 In
reality, this threshold only applies to "large-scale armed conflict,"
and consequently, the majority of internal conflict is not covered
by the Protocol's provisions.211 As Arturo Carrillo-Suirez argues,
"this standard is rarely if ever met by the 'low-intensity' armed
conflict prevalent today."2 12  Furthermore, the threshold criteria
rely on a government accepting that the armed groups have
authority over an area of territory, and the responsibility is on
states to make parties comply with the Protocol.213 States are
204 Protocol II, supra note 17, art. 1.
205 Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 7, art. 3.
206 See Junod, supra note 202, at 29.
207 See id. at 36-37.
208 CASSESE, supra note 92, at 433.
209 See Protocol II, supra note 17, art. 1.
210 See id
211 CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 277; see also CASSESE, supra note 92, at 433.
212 Arturo Carrillo-Sudirez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in International
Humanitarian Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1, 67
(1999).
213 CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 287-88.
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"reluctant" to admit that internal issues are armed conflict.2 14
Protocol II "develops and supplements" Common Article 3
"without modifying its existing conditions of application. "215
Therefore, the restrictive criteria of Article 1 are only relevant for
the application of Protocol II; it does not extend to JHL in general.
The threshold criteria are lower in the Rome Statute of the ICC,
which was adopted in 1998.216 Article 8(2)(f) of the Statute
provides:
Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international
character and thus does not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic
acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to
armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when
there is protracted armed conflict between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups.217
Unlike Protocol II, this non-international armed conflict
definition eliminates the responsible command requirement,
control over the territory, and the participation of government
forces. 218 This definition sets a lower threshold for internal armed
conflict and is more inclusive.2 19
Another weakness of Protocol II is that it almost exclusively
protects "victims of armed conflict" and includes only a handful of
provisions on the "conduct of hostilities."22 0 Cassese notes that the
214 Id
215 See Protocol II, supra note 17, art. 1, 1.
216 See ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 141-42.
217 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
218 See ZEGVELD,supra note 18, at 141-43.
219 Id. (discussing the removal of territorial control which may actually "limit the
application of the instrument").
220 CASSESE, supra note 92, at 419. Protocol I outlines the following: a rule against
giving no quarter (art. 4, 1 10), prohibitions on taking hostages, on terrorism, and pillage
(art. 4, T 2(c), (d), and (g)); prohibitions of attacks on medical units and transport (art.
11); protection of civilian populations against dangers arising from military operations
(art. 13); the provision protecting objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population (art. 14); a rule protecting works and installations containing dangerous
forces (art. 15); and a rule protecting cultural objects and places of worship (art. 16). See
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few provisions applying to conduct mostly benefit those who are
not participating or who have stopped participating in the
conflict. 221  Additionally, the Protocol does not include any
enforcement or supervision mechanisms,22 2 and this severely
weakens the effectiveness and strength of the treaty. No
international body is given the responsibility of determining
whether or not parties comply with the provisions set out in the
Protocol.223 in contrast, some states224 and commentators, such as
Cassese, argue that since the Protocol "develops and supplements"
Common Article 3, it is therefore "under the aegis of Common
Article 3."225 Common Article 3 provides that a humanitarian
organization, such as the ICRC, "may offer its services to the
Parties to the conflict."22 6 Cassese concludes that a humanitarian
organization may "legitimately cover [the] monitoring [of] the
implementation of the Protocol" based on the broad language of
Common Article 3.227
Moreover, although the provisions of Protocol fl were adopted
by consensus, many developing countries raised "strong and
unequivocal objections" and entered reservations severely
weakening the effectiveness of the Protocol.2 8 The Protocol is
only open for signature and ratification by states which are parties
to the Geneva Conventions, 2 29 and it is only applicable to armed
Protocol 1, supra note 8.
221 CASSESE, supra note 92, at 419.
222 Id
223 Id. at 418-19.
224 See Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 1974-1977, Article I of
Draft Protocol II, (Vol. VII), CDDH/SR.49, Annex (Belgium), Annex (Italy), available
at http://www.Loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/RC-dipl-conference-records.html; see also
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, State Parties to the Following International
Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf (select
"table") (last update Jan. 17, 2012).
225 CASSESE, supra note 92, at 419.
226 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
227 CASSESE, supra note 92, at 420.
228 Id. at 433; see Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict,
supra note 224, at 199, 201, 203, 250-51.
229 See Protocol II, supra note 17, arts. 20-22.
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conflict taking place in a territory of a state that has ratified it.230
While 165 states have ratified Protocol II, a number of states in
which internal armed conflict is taking place have not yet done
so. 231
G. Other Multilateral Treaties
There are a number of other multilateral treaties that apply to
NSAGs. Article 1(2) of the Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices to the Conventional Weapons Convention of 3 May 1996
states: "This Protocol shall apply, in addition to situations referred
to in Article 1 of this Convention, to situations referred to in
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949."232 Furthermore, Article 1(2) binds all parties to a conflict
in High Contracting Parties' territory to apply the Protocol.233
Article 19(1) of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict requires armed
opposition groups to implement the rules "which relate to respect
for cultural property" in the event of an internal conflict. 23 4
230 See Customary International Humanitarian Law, THE MAG. OF INT'L RED CROSS
& RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT, http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2005_2/24-
25.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
231 For example, Protocol 11 has not been ratified by Iran, Iraq, Israel, Mexico,
Pakistan, Somalia, or Syria. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, State Parties to the
Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties, supra note 224.
232 Additionally, Article 7(4)(b) of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), while not referring to all non-
international conflict, leaves room for the accession of NLMs. The Article states that
High Contracting Parties meeting the requirements of 96(3) of Additional Protocol I,
even if not a formal party to the CCW or Protocol I, may accept and apply the Geneva
Conventions, CCW, and annexed Protocols to conflict "with immediate effect" and that
they are "equally binding upon all parties to the conflict." See Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980,
1342 U.N.T.S 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980) (entered into force Dec. 2, 1983) [hereinafter
CCW].
233 "This Protocol shall apply, in addition to situations referred to in Article I of this
Convention, to situations referred to in Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature, as not being armed conflicts." See Protocol II, supra note 17, art. 1, 2.
234 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
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Further, Article 19(2) encourages the parties to implement other
provisions of the Convention through special agreements.
Similarly, Article 22 of the Second Protocol to the Cultural
Property Convention of 26 March 1999 applies the Protocol to
armed conflict "not of an international character." 235  The Rome
Statute is the first treaty to contain a detailed list of war crimes and
to confirm that war crimes are applicable to internal armed
conflict.23 6 The Statutes of the ICTR, SCSL, and ICC, as well as a
ruling by the ICTY all set forth the view that serious violations of
customary or treaty rules may amount to war crimes in internal
armed conflict.3
In conclusion, treaty law governing internal armed conflict is
less developed than the treaty law of international armed
conflict.23 8 This is true despite the fact that most armed conflict
today occurs within states.239 Internal armed conflict is subject to
fewer treaty provisions than international armed conflict, with
only a handful of treaties applying to internal armed conflict.240
While Common Article 3 and Protocol II demonstrate an attempt
by states to regulate internal armed conflict, in practice, the
Conflict, art. 19, TT 1-4, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
In the event of an armed conflict not of an international character occurring
within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of the present
Convention which relate to respect for cultural property. The parties to the
Conflict shall endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all
or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization may offer its services to the
parties to the conflict. The application of the preceding provisions shall not
affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict.
Id.
235 Id. art. 22, T 1.
236 SAss(LI & BOUVIER, supra note 91, at 323.
237 CASSESE, supra note 92, at 432; see also Statute of ICTR, art. 4; Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra Lion, art. 3; Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8,
2; Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, % 128-34.
238 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 98, at xxviii.
239 See HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, supra note 2.
240 Steven R. Ratner, International v. Internal Armed Conflict,
http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/intemational-vs-internal-armed-conflict/ (last
visited Jan. 21, 2012).
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provisions lack detail and implementation mechanisms.2 4 1 These
treaties provide a rudimentary framework of laws protecting the
victims of internal armed conflict when compared to the detailed
rules governing international armed conflict.
IV. Case Study of Polisario Front (Western
Sahara/Morocco)
A. Special Agreements and the Work of Geneva Call
Common Article 3 recognizes the importance of special
agreements as a method of bringing NSAGs under the scope of
IHL.242 These agreements are particularly important as the
NSAGs agree to the IHL norms and provisions themselves. This
may increase NSAGs' willingness to comply with the
provisions.24 3 According to Zegveld, the benefits of special
agreements are twofold: (1) they "compel groups to explicitly state
their will and capacity to adhere to the relevant norms," and (2)
they "induce the state to accept the applicability of the relevant
norms to the conflict in question."2 4 4
While some states and actors are hesitant to engage NSAGs, a
number of actors have used a range of methods to interact with
NSAGs.2 45 One of the most commonly cited and useful models of
positive engagement with NSAGs is found in the work of Geneva
Call.246 As previously mentioned, Geneva Call is an international
humanitarian organization "dedicated to engaging armed non-state
actors (NSAs) towards compliance with the norms of international
humanitarian law. . . . [T]he organization focuses on NSAs that
241 Id
242 "The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present
Convention." Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135.
243 ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 28.
244 Id. at 17.
245 See supra Part .B.
246 See CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 295; Sandesh Sivakumaran, Re-envisaging the
International Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 22 EuR. J. INT'L L. 219, 261 (2011); see
also Erwin Dahinden, The Future of Arms Control Law: Towards a New Regulatory




operate outside effective State control." 247  Geneva Call works
with non-state actors, who are otherwise not allowed to sign the
Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction,24 8 to sign a "Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a
Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine
Action."2 4 9 The Deed prohibits "all use, development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of such mines,
under any circumstances."25 0 The signatories also agree to
undertake stockpile destruction, victim assistance, mine education,
and training, among other responsibilities. 251
In 2005, sixty non-state actors were reported to have emplaced
landmines in twenty-four countries. 25 2 Presently, forty-one armed
groups have signed the Deed of Commitment, including armed
groups in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.2 53 The signatories
acknowledge in Article 6 of the Deed that it "does not affect their
legal status, pursuant to the relevant clause in the common [sic]
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions."2 54 Clapham praises the
Deed as a mechanism that allows non-state actors to make
humanitarian commitments "beyond the limiting inter-state
framework" and "beyond their obligations under a formal reading
of international humanitarian law."255  Geneva Call monitors the
non-state actors through a number of mechanisms, including
compliance reports from the groups themselves and an obligation
247 GENEVA CALL, http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
248 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 241,
36 1.L.M. 1507.
249 Deed of Commitment Under Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-
Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action. GENEVA CALL,
http://www.genevacall.org/resources/deed-of-commitment/f-deed-of-
commitment/doc.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Deed of Commitment].
250 Id
251 Id.
252 JANE'S INTELLIGENCE DIGEST, Landmines and Armed Non-State Actors, GENEVA
CALL (Nov. 16, 2007), http://www.genevacall.org/resources/gc-articles/f-gc-
articles/2001-2010/2007-16nov-janeid.htm.
253 GENEVA CALL, supra note 247.
254 Deed of Commitment, supra note 2499, art. 6.
255 CLAPHAM, supra note 54, at 295.
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to allow Geneva Call to monitor and verify compliance.25 6 Next,
this comment introduces an ongoing conflict, which is currently
taking place in the Western Sahara, between the NSAG Polisario
Front and the Moroccan government. The comment also examines
Geneva Call's work with the NSAG to ensure IHL compliance.25 7
B. Non-State Armed Group Polisario Front and
Humanitarian Violations
The Polisario Front (formally known as the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro) has been
seeking the independence of Western Sahara since 1973 .258 The
group was created to oppose Spanish control over Western Sahara
and the claims over the territory by the Kingdom of Morocco and
Mauritania.2 59 Mauritania renounced claims over the area in
1979.260 Nonetheless, Morocco annexed the territory in 1975, and
the conflict has continued between Polisario Front and Morocco
despite mediation efforts largely promoted by the United
Nations. 261' The U.N. brokered a cease-fire in 1991, making way
for a process of negotiations.2 62 Polisario Front and Morocco
agreed on a referendum led by the U.N. Mission for the
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) which asked the
Sahrawi population to choose between independence and
256 About Us, GENEVA CALL, http://www.genevacall.org/about/about.htm (last
visited Jan. 21, 2012).
257 Pamela Epstein, Behind Closed Doors: "Autonomous Colonization" in Post
United Nations Era-the Case For Western Sahara, 15 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L.
107, 111 (2009) ("Located in northwestern Africa, Western Sahara borders Morocco on
the north, Algeria on the northeast, Mauritania to the east and south with 600 miles of
Atlantic Ocean coastline on the west.").
258 Id. at 111-12.
259 Id. at 110-11; see also Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Julia Weiner, Israel's Security
Barrier: An International Comparative Analysis and Legal Evaluation, 37 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 309, 321 (2005) ("In 1975, despite the ICJ's denial of Morocco's claim
over Western Sahara and its holding that the local inhabitants should be granted self-
determination, Morocco invaded the region. When Spanish colonial forces departed in
1976, Morocco proceeded to take control of the northern two-thirds of Western Sahara
while Mauritania took over the southern third.").
260 Epstein, supra note 2577, at 115.
261 Id. at 115-16.
262 Id. at 115.
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integration into Morocco."' The referendum has been postponed
several times, and despite extensions, the negotiations have led to
little progress.264
The conflict in the Western Sahara involves violations of IHL
by Polisario Front, Morocco, and actors from neighboring states. 2 65
An independent commission led by Belgian deputy Denis
Ducarme in 2006 reported many allegations of crimes and abuses
carried out by the Polisario Front, including "systematic torture"
until the 1990s.2 66  A detailed report by the European Strategic
Intelligence Security Centre called the group's human rights
record "mediocre" and stated that its treatment of prisoners "goes
against all the standards established by international
agreements."2 67 The Moroccan government is reported to
"plunder" Western Sahara's national resources, and the
"Moroccan forces humiliated the population, including through
torture, intimidation and disappearances."2 68 The conflict has
forced thousands of refugees from Western Sahara to flee to
bordering countries 269 and resulted in thousands of deaths. 27 0 This
263 Id
264 Hakim Darbouche & Yahia H. Zoubir, Conflicting International Policies and the
Western Sahara Stalemate, 43 INT'L SPECTATOR 91 (2008); see also Security Council
Extends Western Sahara Mission Until 30 April 2009, U.N. S.C., 5884th mtg, U.N. Doc.
SC/9319 (Apr. 30, 2008) (extending MINURSO mandate to April 30, 2009).
265 Carlin Moore et al., Column: International Legal Updates, 16 HUM. RTs. BR. 36,
41 (2009) ("Moroccan police have historically used excessive force against Sahrawis and
others involved in Polisario Front. The Moroccan government has indirectly supported
the violence against innocent civilians by failing to hold police responsible for their
action."). See generally Yahia H. Zoubir, The West Saharan Conflict: A Case Study in
Failure of Prenegotiation and Prolongation of Conflict, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 173
(1996) (discussing the Western Sahara conflict).
266 Denis Ducarme, Report of the Independent Investigative Commission into
Allegations of Violations of Human Rights, Crimes, Abuses and Various
Misappropriations Brought Against the Polisario Front, MOROCCAN AM. CTR FOR
POLICY 10 (Oct. 2006).
267 EUROPEAN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER, The Polisario
Front: A Destabilizing Force in the Region that is Still Active 10 (Oct. 2008),
www.corcas.com/Portals/5/Polisario%20fuerza%20desestabilizacion%20en%20el%20M
agreb.pdf.
268 Maintaining Focus on Western Sahara, Fourth Committee Hears 23 More
Petitioners, U.N. GAOR, 62d Sess., 4th mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/SPD/373 (Oct. 10, 2007).
269 Feinstein & Weiner, supra note 2599, at 322.
270 Press Release, The Polisario Front Continues the Destruction of its Landmine
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forty year conflict in Western Sahara has resulted in systematic
IHL violations by government and NSAG members.271 The next
section examines both how and if the provisions of IHL apply to
the NSAG and other actors involved in this internal armed
conflict.
C. Polisario Front and Geneva Call-Compliance with
International Humanitarian Law
Polisario Front has made a number of positive steps to comply
with IHL. In 2005, Polisario Front released 404 Moroccan
prisoners of war held for more than two decades.27 2 Another
positive step by Polisario Front is its work with Geneva Call to
unilaterally comply with the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty
(MBT).273 As a result of several decades of armed conflict, mines
heavily contaminate Western Sahara.274 The Moroccan army built
walls to protect its territory and reinforced the walls with millions
of landmines.27 5 In November 2005, Polisario Front committed to
Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment.276  This was after lengthy
Stocks, GENEVA CALL, (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.genevacall.org/news/press-releases/f-
press-releases/2001-2010/201 1_GC COMPR AF StockpileDestruction.pdf
(discussing deaths from landmines alone: "Since 1975, there have reportedly been 2,500
casualties, though the total number is not known given the lack of accurate data
collection.").
271 Id.
272 ICRC, 404 Moroccan Prisoners Released (Aug. 18, 2005),
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/6fdgc9?opendocument.
273 GENEVA CALL, Areas of Engagement: Western Sahara Background,
http://www.genevacall.org/Africa/Westem-Sahara/western-sahara.htm (last visited Jan.
21, 2012).
274 Id; see also Pablo San Martin & Joanna C. Allan, The Largest Prison in the
World: Landmines, Walls, UXOs and the UN's Role in the Western Sahara, Grupo de
Estudios Estratdgicos (GEES), at 3 (Apr. 17, 2007), http://www.genevacall.org/news/in-
the-press/f-in-the-press/2001-2010/2007-17apr-gees.pdf ("[T]he U.N. peace mission ...
estimates on its website that 100,000 square kilometres out of 266,000, that is, almost
40% of the Western Sahara is affected by landmines and UXOs.").
275 GENEVA CALL, ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 14 (2006),
http://www.genevacall.org/resources/annual-reports/f-annual-reports/2001-201 0/gc-
annual-report-2006.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2012) [hereinafter GENEVA CALL 2006
ANNUAL REPORT].
276 See Press Release, Western Sahara: The Polisario Front Commits to Ban Anti-




negotiations with Polisario Front's Secretary General and the
President of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.27 7
Polisario Front began destruction of its stockpile of anti-
personnel mines in February 2006 with the destruction of 3,321
antipersonnel mines .278 Engineers from Polisario Front's Ministry
of Defense destroyed an additional 2,000 mines in May 2008.279
As recently as March 4, 2011, Polisario Front destroyed 1,506
mines.28 0 Additionally, Geneva Call sponsored the attendance of a
deputy leader of Polisario Front and a representative of the
Sahrawi at a training camp addressing international mine action
standards.28 1 In April 2011, five senior military officers of
Polisario Front attended a comprehensive training course on IHL
in Geneva.282 Geneva Call requires NSAGs to "establish self-
regulating mechanisms," such as orders, directives, training, and
disciplinary actions "in case of non-compliance." 28 3 The Polisario
Front reports that it has distributed training manuals and ordered
all of its members to enforce the ban.284
Alongside its work with Polisario Front, Geneva Call
277 See id.
278 INT'L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, Western Sahara: Polisario Front
Continues Destruction of Its Antipersonnel Landmine Stockpile,
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/News-Articles/Work/polidestr (last visited
Jan. 17, 2012).
279 See Press Release, The Polisario Front Carries Out Third Landmine
Desctruction Operation, GENEVA CALL (May 21, 2008),
http://www.genevacall.org/news/press-releases/f-press-releases/2001-2010/2008-21 may-
gc-scbl.pdf.
280 See Press Release, The Polisario Front Continues the Destruction of its
Landmine Stocks, GENEVA CALL (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.genevacall.org/news/press-
releases/f-press-releases/200 1-
2010/2011 GCCOMPRAFStockpileDestruction.pdf.
281 See GENEVA CALL 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 275, at 14.
282 See Press Release, Building Knowledge in International Humanitarian Law for
the Polisario Front, GENEVA CALL (May 20, 2011),
http://www.genevacall.org/news/press-releases/f-press-releases/2001-
2010/GC_2011 CommuniquePF Training.pdf.
283 Carine Kaneza, Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by




284 See GENEVA CALL 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 275, at 14-15.
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advocates for Morocco to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty
(MBT).2 85 While Morocco is not a party to the MBT, it submitted
its first voluntary Article 7 report to the U.N. on its
implementation of principles of the treaty in September 2006,
followed by a second report in April 2008.286 It is possible that
Morocco feels increased pressure to submit reports when Polisario
Front voluntarily complies with the provisions of the treaty. The
success of Polisario Front and the other NSAGs that are working
with Geneva Call to comply with the MBT demonstrates the
benefits of engaging NSAGs.287 While there are a handful of
reports of NSAGs violating the Deed, for the most part, Geneva
Call has reported full compliance. 28 8  Geneva Call's engagement
with Polisario Front and at least forty other NSAGs demonstrates
the potential for bringing NSAGs closer to the provisions of
IHL. 289
V. Recommendations and Conclusion
The analysis of the current legal framework reveals the
framework's inadequacy when accommodating and regulating the
actions of NSAGs. The case study of Polisario Front is evidence
that it is both possible and advantageous to engage NSAGs with
285 See Press Release, The Polisario Front Continues the Destruction of its
Landmine Stocks, GENEVA CALL, supra note 279 ("But there is much more to be done.
Twenty years after the ceasefire, landmines continue to kill and maim. Progress is
greatly needed on the other side of the berm, Morocco must also join the AP mine
ban."). It may also be noted that Morocco recently ratified Additional Protocols I and II
on March 6, 2011. See Protocol I, supra note 7, and Protocol II, supra note 17, for the
lists of signatories.
286 Morocco: Mine Ban Policy, LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR,
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/countries/morocco.html (last
visited Jan. 17, 2012). The reports did not include Form B, which provides details of
stockpiles.
287 See GENEVA CALL, ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 15 (2007),
http://www.genevacall.org/resources/annual-reports/f-annual-reports/2001-2010/gc-
annual-report-2007.pdf.
288 See id. Geneva Call reported that three signatory groups, MILF, SPLM/A, and
Kongra Gel/HPG, were "accused by their respective governments of using AP mines
shortly after signing the Deed of Commitment. " Additionally, Puntland and the Jowhar
Administration were reported as having received AP mines. Geneva Call said that they




IHL. This section attempts to address weaknesses of IHL as
applied to NSAGs in internal armed conflict and offers
recommendations that are practical and implementable. Ideally,
while Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocols should be
revised, it is unlikely that states will realistically create new
provisions and an enforcement mechanism. Therefore, this section
offers several non-legal recommendations that may be
implemented within the current legal framework while aiming to
improve the protection of populations during an internal armed
conflict.
A. Increasing Awareness ofIHL Principles
First, to ensure that IHL is respected during an internal armed
conflict, a greater understanding of IHL is necessary so that those
involved in the fighting recognize which rules apply and how.290
Protocol II governing internal armed conflict includes language
that the Protocol must be "disseminated as widely as possible."2 91
Henckaerts asserts that violations of IHL are largely rooted in the
"uncertainty as to their application" and "a lack of awareness of
them on the part of political leaders, commanders, combatants and
the general public."29 2 Increasing awareness of the law applicable
to internal armed conflict will help the leaders and members of
NSAGs and government forces know what actions constitute an
IHL violation and what instructions will ensure compliance.2 93
Education regarding IHL principles during peacetime will help
increase respect and compliance with IHL provisions both before
and during an armed conflict.2 94 Geneva Call has successfully
290 See Sass6li, supra note 29, at 30 ("If those who fight are not properly instructed,
the rule of IHL will never be respected.").
291 Protocol II, supra note 17, art. 19.
292 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict,
87 INT'L R. RED CROSS 175, 176 (2005). A study carried out by the ICRC in twelve
armed conflict areas in 1999 found that fifty-one percent of those surveyed (a mix of
combatants and civilians) had never heard of the Geneva Conventions. See INT'L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS, The People on War Report: ICRC Worldwide Consultation on the
Rules of War, at xviii (Oct. 1999),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0758.pdf.
293 See Henckaerts, supra note 2922, at 176-77.
294 Rather than applying ex post facto provisions through a tribunal or court, such as
the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
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promoted IHL tenets through its training camps on IHL for
Polisario Front and other NSAG members.29 5
There are obstacles to this effort, particularly when an armed
conflict is in progress. As discussed in Part I, the "cell" structure
of many NSAGs, which removes a hierarchical chain of
command, makes it difficult to disseminate information since the
degree to which leaders have control over members varies.296
NSAGs also vary in the degree to which they are willing to
comply with JHL provisions; it might depend on whether or not
doing so coincides with its goals. 297 Furthermore, an NSAG might
lack the necessary resources to disseminate information. 298 These
features of NSAGs make it difficult to effectively explain IHL
principles during an armed conflict. The best "preventative
action," therefore, is to ensure that the general public is aware of
IHL.299 The members of NSAGs are likely to have an awareness
of JHL if an armed conflict breaks out.300
B. Involvement ofNSAGs in the Development oflHL
Earlier parts of this comment discuss the state-centrism of
international law and the concept that NSAGs are bound, in
theory, by treaties created entirely by states.3 01 Since the majority
of internal armed conflict is fought by both government forces and
NSAGs, the effective and realistic development of JHL should
involve NSAGs.3 02 There are several advantages to this approach.
295 See supra Part III.C.
296 See supra Part I.A; see also ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 1.
297 See Hofmann, supra note 9, at 399.
298 See id. at 396 (noting that NSAGs vary in resources).
299 Sass6li, supra note 29, at 30.
300 It is important that education efforts reflect the literacy rates and the language of
the target population. Also, certain sections of the population, such as members of an
NSAG, might be more difficult to reach and require more research and targeted work.
301 See supra Part II.B.
302 Most NSAGs are barred from participating in conferences on IHL. For example,
the Rome Conference on the Criminal Court included 130 state delegations, hundreds of
NGOs, but no members of NSAGs were invited. See CLAUDE BRUDERLEIN, CTR. FOR
HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE, THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN BUILDING HUMAN
SECURITY: THE CASE OF ARMED GROUPS IN INTRA-STATE WARS 7 (May 15, 2000),
available at http://www.hdcentre.org/files/ (select "publications;" then select page 24).
The Diplomatic Conference on the Additional Protocols included eleven national
liberation movements (NLMs) as observers. However, as Sassbli notes, NLMs have a
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First, if members of NSAGs are involved, it will "create[] a sense
of ownership."303 By taking part in the legal process, the NSAG
will become more familiar with the law, and the law itself will
have more credibility with the NSAG. 304 Furthermore, the NSAG
will more likely respect the law if the NSAG was involved in the
law's creation.3 05 As Sass6li reasons, "It is always easier to obtain
respect of a rule invoking the acceptance of that rule by the
addressee than by arguing even the most sophisticated legal
construction."3 0 6
This recommendation faces several practical challenges. As
noted in Part I, the relationship between states and NSAGs is often
politicized, and certain states would likely object to their inclusion
in any treaty-making process or formal meetings.307 The presence
of NSAGs would make the process "even more cumbersome and
political," and it would be very difficult to reach any
agreements.' Furthermore, it is unlikely that many more
diplomatic conferences, such as those that led to the creation of the
Additional Protocols, will be held since most of IHL is codified.30 9
Other legal instruments discussed in Part II, such as special
agreements and unilateral declarations, may provide useful and
more feasible mechanisms to increase the involvement of NSAGs
with IHL.3"o These legal instruments have an advantage in that the
different legal standing than other NSAGs, and it is unlikely that a similar occasion will
arise. See MARCO SASS)LI, POSSIBLE LEGAL MECHANISMS TO IMPROVE COMPLIANCE BY
ARMED GROUPS WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 7 (2003), http://www.genevacall.org/resources/other-documents-studies/f-
other-documents-studies/2001-2010/2003-13nov-sassoli.pdf [hereinafter Possible Legal
Mechanisms].
303 See Marco Sass6li, Engaging Non-State Actors: The New Frontier in
International Humanitarian Law, in GENEVA CALL 2007 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 8-9.
304 See Pascal Bongard, Engaging Armed Non-State Actors on Humanitarian
Norms: The Experience of Geneva Call and the Landmine Ban, in GENEVA CALL 2007
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 108, 112.
305 Id
306 Possible Legal Mechanisms, supra note 3022, at 6.
307 See supra Part I.A.
308 See Sass6li, supra note 29, at 39; see also Possible Legal Mechanisms, supra
note 302, at 6.
309 See Possible Legal Mechanisms, supra note 3022, at 7.
310 See id at 18.
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NSAG makes a commitment voluntarily and independent of the
government that it might be fighting."' These agreements help
clarify the law and hold the NSAGs to specific obligations that
they themselves negotiated.312 Furthermore, special agreements
may be adapted to each particular armed conflict situation
allowing the conflicting parties to extend the rules and offer more
protection than what is required by the existing law."
This is where there is a role for third parties to help facilitate
such agreements. As discussed in Part II, such agreements have
been concluded under the auspices of the ICRC, Geneva Call, and
the U.N.314 States may also facilitate and encourage NSAGs to
commit themselves to the provisions of IHL through special
agreements or unilateral declarations. 315 While NGOs might "gain
freer access" to NSAGs, states and organizations such as the EU
and U.N. have the capacity to deal with problems of a "diplomatic
or political nature."3 16 The most effective engagement with
NSAGs involves using a range of actors, each with a different tool
set. This will ensure the greatest results in bringing NSAGs'
actions in line with the provisions of IHL.
C. Incentives for NSAGs to Comply with IHL
In international armed conflict, combatants that are captured
(and "legitimately participating in hostilities") are "entitled to
prisoner of war status," (POW) which gives them certain rights
and privileges under IHL.' Once designated a POW, an
individual will not be punished for the mere fact of fighting;3 18
however, he may be "tried and punished" for violations of IHL
committed during the hostilities.3 19 This provides combatants in
311 For example, see Part 3 of Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment with NSAGs,
which is agreed upon independently of states and voluntarily by NSAGs. See Deed of
Commitment, supra note 2499.
312 See Sass6li, supra note 29, at 29.
313 See id.
314 See supra Part II.C.
315 Possible Legal Mechanisms, supra note 3022, at 18.
316 Hofmann, supra note 9, at 403-05.





international armed conflict with an incentive to comply with
IHL.32 0 One of the problems with the legal framework regulating
internal armed conflict is that many states treat members of
NSAGs who participate in such conflict under domestic law.321 As
a result, members of NSAGs may be punished simply for fighting,
regardless of the combatant's level of compliance with LHL or
IHRL.322
A number of draft provisions addressing this problem were put
forward and rejected by states during the drafting of Protocol fl.323
For example, the ICRC suggested that tribunals take into account
the accused's level of compliance with Protocol II when issuing a
sentence.3 Sassli also offers a number of solutions to this
difficulty. He suggests that third states deny refugee status to
members of NSAGs that violate IHL and "consider prosecution
for the mere fact of having participated in hostilities" as eligible
grounds for obtaining refugee status.325 Sass6li further suggests
that third states include members of NSAGs in the "exemption
from extradition for political offenders," unless the offender
violated IHL provisions.326 States, the U.N., and other regional
organizations should consider incorporating such incentives into
their policies and agreements with NSAGs.
D. Reporting and Monitoring by NSA Gs on Compliance with
IHL
NSAGs should be encouraged to report periodically on their
compliance with IHL obligations. Reporting is a "traditional, less
intrusive" mechanism which will increase respect for IHL while
easing the task of monitoring compliance.327 Sass6li argues that
the "mere responsibility of writing reports" increases an NSAG's
320 Possible Legal Mechanisms, supra note 3022, at 13-14.




325 Possible Legal Mechanisms, supra note 3022, at 13-14 (noting an example of
this in the case of Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
(1993), [1994] 1 F.C. 433 (Can. C.A.), in which a member of the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was denied refugee status for violating IHL).
326 Id. at 14.
327 Id.
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"awareness of and sensitivity to IHL" and also creates a sense of
ownership.3 28 Geneva Call requires NSAGs that sign a Deed of
Commitment to report on their compliance and the steps they have
taken to implement the provisions of the Deed.32 9 The NSAGs
also agree to allow monitoring and verification.3 30
The recipients of such reports might be U.N. bodies, states,
and NGOs. The ICRC would be a sensible organization for
NSAGs to report to, since the ICRC has an explicit legal basis for
working with NSAGs.3 3 ' Nonetheless, Sass6li notes that the ICRC
might jeopardize its relationship with NSAGs if it has to comment
on NSAGs' reports.332 For this reason, Sass6li suggests the
creation of a "distinct, independent, expert body" to receive
reports and comment on those reports.333 The body "might be
established in the framework of the U.N." or it might operate
either in conjunction with the ICRC and the Red Crescent33 4 or
328 Sass6li, supra note 29, at 31.
329 See Deed of Commitment, supra note 249, at part 3; see also supra Part III.
330 See id. Another useful example is found in the work of the U.N. Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which recommends that
transnational corporations report on compliance with IHRL to the U.N. and other
organizations. See SASS(LI, supra note 3023, at 14 (citing U.N. Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human
Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess. (Aug. 7, 2003), U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev. 1).
331 Common Article 3(2) provides: "An impartial humanitarian body, such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the
conflict." Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 7, art. 3.
332 Possible Legal Mechanisms, supra note 302, at 15; see, e.g., S.C. Res. 1193,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 193 (Aug. 28, 1998) (concerning Afghanistan); S.C. Res. 1010, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1010 (Aug. 10, 1995) (concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina); S.C. Res. 913,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/913 (Aug. 28, 1994) (concerning the Former Yugoslavia), and S.C.
Res. 814, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993) (concerning Somalia), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc-resolutions.html (search applicable year).
333 Possible Legal Mechanisms, supra note 3022, at 15.
334 The ICRC has held six international conferences since 1986 to discuss
humanitarian matters. The conferences include State parties to the Geneva Conventions
and representatives of ICRC organizations. Observers, such as members of NGOs,
international organizations, and regional organizations were invited as observers.
Michael Meyer, The Importance of the International Conference of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent to National Societies: Fundamental in Theory and in Practice, 91 INT'L




with the meetings of the parties to the Geneva Conventions.3 35
Scholars such as Sass6li have suggested that NSAGs set up a
monitoring system themselves. 3 6 This suggestion does not rely on
states, and it may increase the credibility of NSAGs that claim to
respect IHL. NSAGs that have signed Geneva Call's Deed of
Commitment agree to monitor their implementation of the Deed.3
By incorporating IHL and a monitoring mechanism into codes of
conduct, unilateral declarations, or special agreements, NSAGs
may help increase their members' respect of IHL on their own
initiative."
Other international bodies may play a role in monitoring
NSAGs. The U.N. Security Council and the "U.N. Human Rights
Commission have condemned violations of IHL" by NSAGs
during internal armed conflict; 3 9 this illustrates international
bodies' ability to assess such groups and their actions. The U.N.
facilitated an agreement between the Frente Farabundo Marti para
la Liberaci6n Nacional (FMNL) and the government of El
Salvador, which included arrangements for U.N. monitoring and
verification of the agreement's implementation.3 40 The U.N.
provided a report detailing the violations of all parties to the
conflict and providing recommendations based on the U.N.'s
observations."' Thus, the U.N. is capable of monitoring the
actions of NSAGs during internal armed conflict. A monitoring
system that includes states, the U.N., NSAGs, field workers, and
an independent expert body would open the lines of
communication between all actors involved in the conflict and
335 The Swiss Government convened the First Periodical Meeting on International
Humanitarian Law in Geneva from January 19-23, 1998. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, First Periodical Meeting on International Humanitarian Law, ICRC,
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jpcn.htm.
336 Possible Legal Mechanisms, supra note 3022, at 18.
337 Id at 11.
338 Id at 6.
339 Id. at 15.
340 See Agreement on Human Rights between El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo
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help ensure that IHL is respected.
In reality, certain NSAGs may neither implement and enforce
the recommendations nor respect the provisions of IHL during
internal armed conflict. Furthermore, states may not accept many
of the recommendations and may refuse to open a dialogue with
NSAGs. Yet, the creation of implementation and enforcement
mechanisms signifies a move towards more serious protection and
regulation of internal armed conflict, and such mechanisms would
likely help close the gap between the regulation of internal and
international armed conflict.342 There is a role for external actors
to disseminate and clarify IHL in hopes of educating members of
NSAGs, the general public, and states. A greater awareness of the
concept that even war itself has limits and certain rules apply
during a conflict, will help saves lives in the future. In the end, the
success of these recommendations will depend on the attitude and
the will of the states and NSAGs involved in armed conflict.
These recommendations, if implemented, have the potential to
influence the behavior of NSAGs and states alike, as well as to
ultimately improve the lives of people affected by internal armed
conflict.
VI. Conclusion
The traditional type of war, involving government forces
fighting on battlefields on foreign soil, has been replaced by armed
conflict waged in cities and villages within a state.34 3 In much of
the present-day internal armed conflict, the distinction between
combatants and civilians is disregarded, and the combatants are
not held accountable for their actions.344 Given the proliferation of
internal armed conflict, the high number of NSAGs that take part
in such conflict, and the atrocities that are committed by such
groups, it is imperative that IHL adequately regulates the behavior
of NSAGs.
Part II provided an overview of the main characteristics of
342 See id. at 11 ("[I]t is urgent to improve the compliance, by such armed groups, of
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and of International Human Rights Law. The
latter branch, applying equally in instances short of armed conflicts, also deserves better
respect by armed groups involved in internal tensions and disturbances.").
343 See GRAVINGHOLT ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.
344 See ZEGVELD, supra note 18, at 1-3.
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NSAGs and the challenges these groups bring to IHL. Part III
outlined the legal framework regulating internal armed conflict,
highlighting the weaknesses of the current legal regime. This
section examined legal tools, such as special agreements, which
help facilitate increased respect of IHL by NSAGs. Part IV
provided a case study to illustrate the ability to encourage NSAGs
to cooperate and comply with IHL. Part V laid out
recommendations that, if implemented, have the potential to
improve the effectiveness of the legal framework, increase respect
and compliance by NSAGs of IHL, and consequently improve the
lives of populations affected by internal armed conflict.
In conclusion, the distinction between internal and
international or state and non-state is meaningless to the people
living in areas of armed conflict. All people deserve protection
from the violence of armed conflict, regardless of whether the
parties involved are states or NSAGs or both. There is an urgent
need for a legal framework that will hold NSAGs more
accountable and will provide greater protection for people living
in situations of internal armed conflict.
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